Shackled by self doubts, working for others..India resumes talks with Pakistan

First appeared as a post in Bharat Rakshak forum.

Gentle Readers,

In my earlier posts here, I had contended that the only institution that is holding the artificial state of Pakistan together is now the Pakistani Army. Over the years, they have shown two principal traits:

1. Unity of command, they have adhered to the formal hierarchical legacy of the British Indian Army where the COAS commands the absolute loyalty of the officer cadre, backed by an izzat and imaan based loyalty between the jawan and the afsars of the Pakistani Fauj. It has withstood, the break up of the country and an abject surrender. While the Bengali Army and officer cadre broke away, even then there were some muslim loyalists in the Bangla Army who went on to take over Bangladesh and return it to a pro-pakistan, and anti-India line.

2. Capacity and willingness to turn on their own countrymen if so ordered. It happened in East Pakistan, several times in Baluchistan, Pakthooni lands, in the Northern Area, in Hyderabad, Sindh. When it comes to questioning the supremacy of the army in Pakistan by any other groups inside Pakistan, the Pakistani Army has not hesitated to crush its challengers with an iron hand.

That is why the present mutiny inside the Pakistani Army is interesting. Gentle readers, please note that this is a big change. There is a revolt inside the PA and it seems to be spreading. It is spreading in the officer corps as well as the jawans. The Pakistani Army is showing for the first time signs of moving away from its defining characterstics. While the leadership wants to crush the mullahs who have acquired a mind of their own, the PA middle rank and jawans, for the first time, are showing reluctance. In a way, Musharaff sensed it and that is why he wanted to do a deal with jehadis. Amongst other things, it helped him to keep his forces united and backing him fully. Let it not be said that BR missed this important change.

What does this signify? Think from the perspective of Kiyani. There is pressure from the Americans to crackdown on Jehadis. There is enlighted self interest in showing the jehadis their place. At the same time, there is pressure from his own force not to go after jehadis. For taking them on, will turn the most important lever of power and lever of equivalence that the Pakistani Army has to hurt India, off. It is imperative for Kiyani to somehow unite Pakistan's now desparate forces to rally back around the pakistani army. The US is more interested in minimising its losses and destroying the taliban and Al quaeda's base in Pakistan. They do not care that much for saving the state. They may be even comfortable of a split Pakistan that leaves behind a dominant rump state which can balance India.

So what will Kiyani do? He is likely to activate some of the sarkari jehadis to unleash terror in India, both in J&K as well other parts. His objective will be to provoke India, to act. That will allow him to get his forces out of the increasing involvement into Civil War. India will then be used to rally the strident jehadis to stop their assault and come under the fold of the army. It could help the Pakistani Army to plead helplessness with the US and make US force India to talk and back down. The Army will use the civilian front, especially Gilani, to make demands on India as a price for continued support to the US.

How can India react? There are two schools of thougts. One is not to get provoked and give the room to the PA by agreeing to talk to the civilian leadership, whilst keeping the pressure on them to refrain from terror attacks through the jehadi group. It would also entail the Government of India to call for significant US support to add to the pressure on Pakistan.

The second is to recognise the opportunity that is being presented and go after securing Indian interests by way of holding back on talks or normalization, increasing diplomatic pressure, preparing for averting terror attacks that will be attempted and carefully using military pressure through acquisition of game changers, series of well designed military exercises oriented towards demonstrating retribution strikes deep inside pakistan, starting covert operations to furtner accentuate the widening differences between regions internally. Let us bear in mind that all this would mean confronting and conflicting the US.

Judging by recent actions of the GoI it seems to me that option 1 is being persued. Maybe that is the right one to pursue at this stage. It would be more in line with the vision of India and the priorities of the present administration. The emphasis is to continue to grow and limit the potential of pakistan to damage or threaten the growth prospects in India. So India will do only that which it is necessary to protect India. A minimum credible defence of India. We have to recognise that this seems to be the desire of majority of Indians. It is another matter if this is right or wrong.

It might be a bit unpalatable to many here, but many Indians, I do believe, feel that a strong and stable Pakistan is possible and that such a state will willingly accept the reality of India and will live as good neighbours, if not as good friends. It may be even more unpalatable but there is a significant section of Indian elite, who believe that "inclusive growth" should extend to all our neighbours and we must help Pakistan at its hour of crisis.

Gentle Readers, think a little harder and further, and you will get to what I am indicating through these posts. I am making the following points:

1. There is a conflict of interest between what will serve India and what will serve US with regard to Pakistan. It is not in India's interest in anyway for the artificial state of Pakistan to survive. The US on the other hand wants it to survive if it can and be the cat's paw for them against Jehadis who have a thing or two against the US.

2. The state of Pakistan is at the brink, and its much vaunted survival instincts are undergoing its severest test. The institution that still has a stake in holding the artificial state of Pakistan together is the Pakistani Army. It is now caught in a three way pincer (if you can imagine one!) of American pressure, Islamic Jehadis who dream of taking over from them as the top dog and a resurgent India.

3. The benefactors of Pakistan have often conflicting and competing interests in Pakistan but all of them would like the state to survive. However, there is now a limitation on what they can do to save the state. This presents an opportunity for India.

4. The final arbiter and keeper of Pakistani destiny, the Pakistan Army is facing a major change in circumstances and its cohesiveness and hold over itself is now under threat. Its leadership no longer enjoys the unity of command, nor is there a willingness to crush internal revolts to its leadership.

So gentle reader, think a little bit more and you will get the answer. What we cannot afford at this point is a policy of drift or a policy of convergence with US interests. What is seen however is a mixture of both. That is the worrying part. The relenting of pressure and resumptions of talks serves American interests, it does not serve ours.

India is looking for a minimum credible defence against pakistan so that 8% GDP growth is achieved. While it is important to chase that growth, there should be a recognition that guaranteeing that growth can only be done by securing India and protecting soverign interests. National Security and neutralizing Pakistan seems to have been relegated to a distant second in terms of priorities. It would be a costly mistake and a remiss on the part of GOI if that is indeed the case.

Such a view, is at best a lonely lament nowadays. The vast majority of Indians and the GOI does not seem to realize the need of the hour or the opportunity that is presenting itself. As usual these are just stray thoughts steming from the rumblings in the wind. Take it for what it is worth.