Blast from the Past – Things said and unsaid….. (appeared as a post in Bharat Rakshak forum)
Gentle readers,
Thanks to all of you who have shown interest in what this rambler has to say. I thought it best to collect my thoughts more cogently once again and the result is this post. It is but an alternate view point and expands on some of the ideas that I had expressed in the email. So please take it as such. I claim no expertise on technical aspects of neither thermo nuclear devices nor access to strategic thinkers. This is just my take on it by reading the straws in the wind.
Santhanam’s coming out in the open is very significant. Those who know the gentleman and his contributions to India’s nuclear capabilities will no doubt take his view very seriously. What he has laid out is more a case for why there is a need for more testing. It is not an indictment of the thermo-nuclear device that was exploded – not of its design, not of the capability to produce one. Why then the need for additional tests? Read his carefully nuanced position again, gentle readers, for it reveals certain clear nuances.
First, he has made his case based on international doubts on the thermo-nuclear capability of India. He has not commented on the correctness or otherwise of it.
Second, he has made this statement to make a point that India should not be signing up to any disarmament initiative such as CTBT without further tests. The logic he has placed is based on the case made by western naysayers of Indian capability. He has used their words and stance to make a case on why India should not sign up and indeed carry out more tests.
Third, more importantly, why has he said what he has said now? He was party to the assertion by the GOI that India had a thermo-nuclear device and that there were no further tests required. He was the test director. It was done under his watch. Even if the tests indicated that the design was flawed and the yield was not as expected, it was his responsibility to declare whether the results succeeded or not as much as the senior team members involved. It cannot be that he has acquiesced to some governmental pressure then. He is not made that way. He could have come out earlier, when the nuclear deal was being negotiated, but he did not. He could have come out with papers and seminars when he was at IDSA as a Director, he did not do so. Until now.
There is a reason as to why he has said it now. Gentle readers, I urge you to think through on these lines and review what has been happening in the recent past. Both in the region and in international fora.
With regard to the question whether the test was a “fizzle” or a success, there are of course two views. As evidenced here in BR and elsewhere. But let us take at face value what every one is concluded as to what Santhanam is claiming - that the thermo-nuke test was a failure. It is another matter, that most media personnel are tarring the entire exercise as failure. Let us ignore that for a while. They are being their usual incompetent selves.
Let me now try and present an alternate view which is slightly different then the popular belief that is now gaining ground as a result of Santhanam’s remarks. The popular views is that are gaining ground as a result of Santhanam’s remarks are:
1. India does not have thermo nuclear capability as the test was a failure, without further tests it is impossible to claim that we have the capability.
2. India needs to do a series of tests and this is now not realistically possible as this would jeopardize the US India nuclear deal and its economic goals
3. India is therefore consigned to the levels of a second rate nuclear power like North Korea and Pakistan and is not in the league of P5.
4. India as a result cannot attain the second strike capability thus rendering its stated nuclear doctrine ineffective
What then is the unstated objective of India’s detractors – both declared and undeclared ones? That India should therefore give up its pursuit of great power status as a military power of reckoning and agree to be part of a coalition of democracies under the umbrella of other powers. This really is the essence of it. There are other things but let us keep it simple here.
From what I can understand of how India’s nuclear policies and capabilities are managed after reading some of the notable publications on the subject, it is clear that multiple dimensions are managed at different levels and the overall picture and control is maintained by a small group attached to the PMO.
What could be this structure? Here is my take on it.
Policy Group – A small group headed by the PM, responsible for taking all decisions in terms of policy, what capability should be achieved, what should be the time frame and who should know what. Provides funding and other support and does the overall oversight. This is the highest level and probably privy to all aspects of India’s nuclear capabilities and programmes. Even here, there could be only a few in this group who may know everything.
Technical Group – An inter institutional group probably headed by the Scientific Advisor to the PM. Responsible for briefing the policy group on what capabilities can be achieved, what is the trend in the field, building the capability, testing and offering professional technical advice. Takes inputs from National Security Advisor in terms of what challenges have to be met and by when. Two key institutions in this are DRDO and BARC.
One key feature to be noted - there could be sub-groups set up that are authorized to carry out specific tasks. They will be provided necessary inputs to carry out the task but will not have complete knowledge of the whole programme, but only the part they are concerned with.
Second key feature is that for every project team, there is a cross institutional peer review team that gives its independent advice to the Policy Group on claims and results.
Operational Group – Essentially the user groups of armed forces coordinated by Strategic Command. This will provide the operational requirements and professional advice on threat perceptions to the Policy Group and Technical Group. It is most likely responsible for maintenance of capability, training, stockpile stewardship support. In addition, it is likely to be responsible for assisting the technical group in conducting tests and user trails. Once again, there is every likelihood of sub-groups who are tasked specific responsibilities and the extent of exposure to information is limited to the same. A strict need to know basis rule is in place as to who knows what and to what extent.
Security Group: A dedicated multi institution team that is tasked with the responsibility of maintaining secrecy and opaqueness. It is also likely that this team is tasked with misinformation and disinformation responsibilities as well.
The above is purely my take, and I may be totally wrong or totally right or somewhere in between. The point is something like this structure controls the entire gamut of Indian Nuclear capability.
It is in this context, the 1998 tests should be looked at. If indeed there was a problem with the thermo nuclear device, it is simply very difficult for a group of people to subvert the system and mislead the government into a false sense of achievement. Having said that, there could be a situation that a test result is misrepresented and decisions are made based on that. Let us assume now for arguments sake, given that Santhanam has spoken out, that this happened with regard to the thermo nuclear device.
Available evidence suggests, that there was a dispute raised internally by members of the DRDO team based on their instruments and readings. This was put up to a committee comprising both BARC and DRDO and the said committee has accepted the BARC counter. The said committee would have had all the details to take its view. None outside it would have it. PK Iyengar was not part of it. So while he had his doubts and expressed it openly, he was not in a position to prove that the test was a fizzle conclusively. He came up with his doubts and they were valid ones. Was Santhanam part of the committee? Did he know every detail? Most likely, Yes. That is why his comments are to be taken seriously. If he did not, at least his public utterances does not give that impression. Hence, his nuanced position on the topic. If he was indeed part of that committee, then he was party to the technical advice given.
The advice was that India had the capability of building a thermonuclear device. There was a small technical snag that can be corrected without resorting to full scale tests immediately. Also, the deviation between design yield and observed yield was explained by this snag. It is likely that the technical group gave this professional advice to the Policy Group. What it did not expect was that there would be no further chances to test if it was needed.
Now the Policy Group had the enormous task of dealing with the aftermath of this decision. There were several key people assigned with specific responsibilities and they all delivered. Advani was tasked with provoking Pakistan to test so that the nuclear capability of Pakistan and its origin was opened up. He delivered on that. Yashwant was tasked with mitigating the effect of sanctions on growth and capital flow. He delivered on that. George was tasked with bringing into open the Chinese threat as a principal reason for Indian decision and he delivered on that. Jaswant was tasked with handling the real politik impact of the decision and he delivered on that.
It was the decision of the Policy Group to declare the voluntary moratorium to blunt the US attack and pressure on CTBT. Jaswant was even asked to discuss this with Talbott later. This was something that was not needed. This was a self lock that came in handy for the GOI but also provided some leverage to USG when it came to the nuclear deal negotiations. But it probably made sense at that time, given the all out effort made to Cap Rollback and Eliminate and prop up China by the USG. The GOI was careful enough to have a key to the lock by stating that the moratorium will stay indefinitely but will be periodically subject to scrutiny based on security and threat assessments.
This must have come as a surprise to the technical group. They were not expecting such a public declaration of moratorium but rather expecting a non published as the post 1974 hold back of GOI.
Coming to the present situation, the Indo US Nuclear deal gave access to India to enter the international arena and participate as an “equal. ” The present administration was faced with a dilemma; the Uranium availability had reached a critical stage. It was vital that Indian nuclear industry developed to meet the growing energy demands and India had access to this in unconstrained manner. They got a deal with the US. The present GOI in my opinion was willing to limit its military programme and freeze it with a view to seize the opportunity that Bush administration was presenting. But what was offered first and what was concluded in the end was somewhat different.
It was still the right thing to do. As long as one was confident that in the case of supreme National interest, the GOI will not hesitate to test no matter what the cost to it post the deal. Moreover, the cost was limited to what was exposed to the US and its laws. But the USG had other ideas and they did attempt to CRE yet again. Case in point, their attempt to ensure FBR was brought under scrutiny and only in the civilian sector, their subsequent reneging on ENR technology etc.
The willingness of the PM and his team to clinch this deal at the cost of surrendering sovereign options was shocking to quite a few. Inside the establishment, Anil Kakodkar took the step of speaking out to ensure that it did not happen and forced the issue.
The present act of Santhanam could be a result of something similar. Is the GOI headed by the current economist PM ready to surrender India’s sovereign options (not soverignity) in terms of its nuclear policy and capability to secure more support for its accelerated economic growth?
In support of such an assertion, the data points are there. MMS has always been at best a lukewarm supporter of nuclear weapons. His stint as FM saw him prevent PVN twice from testing. He has withheld funds from AEC to build domestic Uranium capability as well as the three stage programme when he was Director there representing FM. His world vision for India seems decidedly based on being an economic power and acting in concert with other democracies and multi literalism. This is demonstrated time and again by his speeches at international fora. His willingness to overlook Indian interests and sensibilities and agreeing to try and save Pakistan in order to serve US interests there are all data points.
In contrast, the same PM has also been responsible for ensuring support to vital programmes like missile defence and ATV. Has also gone on record that he would support these delivery mechanisms to ensure the Draft Nuclear Doctrine envisaged triad is available to the armed forces. His government has also sanctioned the highest number of border projects in recent times in reaction to the Chinese threats. He has also kicked off ambitious and qualitative overhaul of capabilities in conventional forces as well.
So what is the real agenda of MMS? It seems to me that he is interested in freezing whatever capability there is and try hard for a genuine disarmament effort. In his vision, he sees nuclear capability is a distraction from the main mission of economic growth. He does not want India as a global power in all its dimensions. I have called it the Japan Model in the past. He is therefore more likely to sign up to multilateral agreements as long as India is allowed to keep its capabilities at the current levels and he wants in exchange complete and unhindered access to technology and capital so that India emerges as one of the leading economic power first. Maybe he believes, that once that is achieved, India will be in a position to assert itself and catch up on the military and power projection fronts. India then will have the strength to disregard agreements and unequal pieces of paper signed now.
With the current main opposition in disarray and somewhat on the defensive, it is unlikely that it will be in a position to effectively oppose any move by the GOI to go ahead and sign up agreements like CTBT or FMCT.
Santhanam is a nationalist. Those who have had the opportunity of interacting with him would know what he feels about India’s position in the world and the nuclear apartheid. He is not alone. There are others in the establishments who have a clear idea what India should aim for. Shyam Saran’s speech is another example of that line of thinking.
In my view, Santhanam does not want India to surrender its nuclear options and hence his coming out in the open and using the arguments of the west to make a case for it. It is a much nuanced stance he is taking here. It could also be a desperate bid to prevent it by sparking a debate. Anil Kakodkar was successful to some extent in protecting Indian interests earlier during the Indo-US negotiations. This time Santhanam has taken it upon himself to do so.
The contra view to the above is that MMS and the GOI are facing acute pressure to sign up to the CTBT or FMCT. GOI does not want to sign up and hence is using the arguments of the NPA community by turning it on its head and sparking a debate in India for creating a favourable environment for not signing any such options curtailing deal and also testing the thermonuclear device. Why now? Because the delivery systems are all ready and there has been further refinement of the weapon design in the intervening period. Santhanam is ideally placed to place the doubt in public domain, create a debate and then let the GOI be seen as responding to it as a mature government and testing.
Why is there need for test? My view is that the test is necessary to establish firmly and unambiguously the deterrence value and not so much as proving technical capability. As I said, those who will have doubts about it will have it. And those who don’t will not have it. But there is no place for doubts when it comes to establishing deterrence value that is more critical to India given the NFU posture it has adopted.
If the contra view is the right one, then the GOI in the next few days will come out with clear statements that it will not sign up to CTBT or FMCT in hurry and the moratorium will be reviewed periodically. If there is a need as per the security and threat perception or a need for improving the safety and reliability of Indian Nuclear arsenal, then GOI will seek to suspend the moratorium. Of course, there will be the mandatory statement of India is committed to nuclear weapons free world and everyone is family sentiments expressed. That will be a clear indication that Santhanam was doing his appointed role by GOI.
If on the other hand, they try to come down heavily on his comments and brush his call for not signing CTBT and carrying more tests then the former is the reality. What GOI does in the coming weeks will clear up what is going on.
That is why I feel that the debate is not about whether the thermonuclear device “fizzled” or performed. That will always continue and no one will know for sure. What Santhanam is doing is using that debate and the doubts and aspersions cast by the NPA lobby and the west to keep Indian sovereign options open. To that extent, gentle readers, what he has said is important and what he has left unsaid is equally important too.
It is a rather long post, so those who have patiently read through it, please note that this is just a ramble and one person’s reading of tea leaves.
Friday, August 28, 2009
Saturday, June 20, 2009
Shackled by self doubts, working for others..India resumes talks with Pakistan
First appeared as a post in Bharat Rakshak forum.
Gentle Readers,
In my earlier posts here, I had contended that the only institution that is holding the artificial state of Pakistan together is now the Pakistani Army. Over the years, they have shown two principal traits:
1. Unity of command, they have adhered to the formal hierarchical legacy of the British Indian Army where the COAS commands the absolute loyalty of the officer cadre, backed by an izzat and imaan based loyalty between the jawan and the afsars of the Pakistani Fauj. It has withstood, the break up of the country and an abject surrender. While the Bengali Army and officer cadre broke away, even then there were some muslim loyalists in the Bangla Army who went on to take over Bangladesh and return it to a pro-pakistan, and anti-India line.
2. Capacity and willingness to turn on their own countrymen if so ordered. It happened in East Pakistan, several times in Baluchistan, Pakthooni lands, in the Northern Area, in Hyderabad, Sindh. When it comes to questioning the supremacy of the army in Pakistan by any other groups inside Pakistan, the Pakistani Army has not hesitated to crush its challengers with an iron hand.
That is why the present mutiny inside the Pakistani Army is interesting. Gentle readers, please note that this is a big change. There is a revolt inside the PA and it seems to be spreading. It is spreading in the officer corps as well as the jawans. The Pakistani Army is showing for the first time signs of moving away from its defining characterstics. While the leadership wants to crush the mullahs who have acquired a mind of their own, the PA middle rank and jawans, for the first time, are showing reluctance. In a way, Musharaff sensed it and that is why he wanted to do a deal with jehadis. Amongst other things, it helped him to keep his forces united and backing him fully. Let it not be said that BR missed this important change.
What does this signify? Think from the perspective of Kiyani. There is pressure from the Americans to crackdown on Jehadis. There is enlighted self interest in showing the jehadis their place. At the same time, there is pressure from his own force not to go after jehadis. For taking them on, will turn the most important lever of power and lever of equivalence that the Pakistani Army has to hurt India, off. It is imperative for Kiyani to somehow unite Pakistan's now desparate forces to rally back around the pakistani army. The US is more interested in minimising its losses and destroying the taliban and Al quaeda's base in Pakistan. They do not care that much for saving the state. They may be even comfortable of a split Pakistan that leaves behind a dominant rump state which can balance India.
So what will Kiyani do? He is likely to activate some of the sarkari jehadis to unleash terror in India, both in J&K as well other parts. His objective will be to provoke India, to act. That will allow him to get his forces out of the increasing involvement into Civil War. India will then be used to rally the strident jehadis to stop their assault and come under the fold of the army. It could help the Pakistani Army to plead helplessness with the US and make US force India to talk and back down. The Army will use the civilian front, especially Gilani, to make demands on India as a price for continued support to the US.
How can India react? There are two schools of thougts. One is not to get provoked and give the room to the PA by agreeing to talk to the civilian leadership, whilst keeping the pressure on them to refrain from terror attacks through the jehadi group. It would also entail the Government of India to call for significant US support to add to the pressure on Pakistan.
The second is to recognise the opportunity that is being presented and go after securing Indian interests by way of holding back on talks or normalization, increasing diplomatic pressure, preparing for averting terror attacks that will be attempted and carefully using military pressure through acquisition of game changers, series of well designed military exercises oriented towards demonstrating retribution strikes deep inside pakistan, starting covert operations to furtner accentuate the widening differences between regions internally. Let us bear in mind that all this would mean confronting and conflicting the US.
Judging by recent actions of the GoI it seems to me that option 1 is being persued. Maybe that is the right one to pursue at this stage. It would be more in line with the vision of India and the priorities of the present administration. The emphasis is to continue to grow and limit the potential of pakistan to damage or threaten the growth prospects in India. So India will do only that which it is necessary to protect India. A minimum credible defence of India. We have to recognise that this seems to be the desire of majority of Indians. It is another matter if this is right or wrong.
It might be a bit unpalatable to many here, but many Indians, I do believe, feel that a strong and stable Pakistan is possible and that such a state will willingly accept the reality of India and will live as good neighbours, if not as good friends. It may be even more unpalatable but there is a significant section of Indian elite, who believe that "inclusive growth" should extend to all our neighbours and we must help Pakistan at its hour of crisis.
Gentle Readers, think a little harder and further, and you will get to what I am indicating through these posts. I am making the following points:
1. There is a conflict of interest between what will serve India and what will serve US with regard to Pakistan. It is not in India's interest in anyway for the artificial state of Pakistan to survive. The US on the other hand wants it to survive if it can and be the cat's paw for them against Jehadis who have a thing or two against the US.
2. The state of Pakistan is at the brink, and its much vaunted survival instincts are undergoing its severest test. The institution that still has a stake in holding the artificial state of Pakistan together is the Pakistani Army. It is now caught in a three way pincer (if you can imagine one!) of American pressure, Islamic Jehadis who dream of taking over from them as the top dog and a resurgent India.
3. The benefactors of Pakistan have often conflicting and competing interests in Pakistan but all of them would like the state to survive. However, there is now a limitation on what they can do to save the state. This presents an opportunity for India.
4. The final arbiter and keeper of Pakistani destiny, the Pakistan Army is facing a major change in circumstances and its cohesiveness and hold over itself is now under threat. Its leadership no longer enjoys the unity of command, nor is there a willingness to crush internal revolts to its leadership.
So gentle reader, think a little bit more and you will get the answer. What we cannot afford at this point is a policy of drift or a policy of convergence with US interests. What is seen however is a mixture of both. That is the worrying part. The relenting of pressure and resumptions of talks serves American interests, it does not serve ours.
India is looking for a minimum credible defence against pakistan so that 8% GDP growth is achieved. While it is important to chase that growth, there should be a recognition that guaranteeing that growth can only be done by securing India and protecting soverign interests. National Security and neutralizing Pakistan seems to have been relegated to a distant second in terms of priorities. It would be a costly mistake and a remiss on the part of GOI if that is indeed the case.
Such a view, is at best a lonely lament nowadays. The vast majority of Indians and the GOI does not seem to realize the need of the hour or the opportunity that is presenting itself. As usual these are just stray thoughts steming from the rumblings in the wind. Take it for what it is worth.
Gentle Readers,
In my earlier posts here, I had contended that the only institution that is holding the artificial state of Pakistan together is now the Pakistani Army. Over the years, they have shown two principal traits:
1. Unity of command, they have adhered to the formal hierarchical legacy of the British Indian Army where the COAS commands the absolute loyalty of the officer cadre, backed by an izzat and imaan based loyalty between the jawan and the afsars of the Pakistani Fauj. It has withstood, the break up of the country and an abject surrender. While the Bengali Army and officer cadre broke away, even then there were some muslim loyalists in the Bangla Army who went on to take over Bangladesh and return it to a pro-pakistan, and anti-India line.
2. Capacity and willingness to turn on their own countrymen if so ordered. It happened in East Pakistan, several times in Baluchistan, Pakthooni lands, in the Northern Area, in Hyderabad, Sindh. When it comes to questioning the supremacy of the army in Pakistan by any other groups inside Pakistan, the Pakistani Army has not hesitated to crush its challengers with an iron hand.
That is why the present mutiny inside the Pakistani Army is interesting. Gentle readers, please note that this is a big change. There is a revolt inside the PA and it seems to be spreading. It is spreading in the officer corps as well as the jawans. The Pakistani Army is showing for the first time signs of moving away from its defining characterstics. While the leadership wants to crush the mullahs who have acquired a mind of their own, the PA middle rank and jawans, for the first time, are showing reluctance. In a way, Musharaff sensed it and that is why he wanted to do a deal with jehadis. Amongst other things, it helped him to keep his forces united and backing him fully. Let it not be said that BR missed this important change.
What does this signify? Think from the perspective of Kiyani. There is pressure from the Americans to crackdown on Jehadis. There is enlighted self interest in showing the jehadis their place. At the same time, there is pressure from his own force not to go after jehadis. For taking them on, will turn the most important lever of power and lever of equivalence that the Pakistani Army has to hurt India, off. It is imperative for Kiyani to somehow unite Pakistan's now desparate forces to rally back around the pakistani army. The US is more interested in minimising its losses and destroying the taliban and Al quaeda's base in Pakistan. They do not care that much for saving the state. They may be even comfortable of a split Pakistan that leaves behind a dominant rump state which can balance India.
So what will Kiyani do? He is likely to activate some of the sarkari jehadis to unleash terror in India, both in J&K as well other parts. His objective will be to provoke India, to act. That will allow him to get his forces out of the increasing involvement into Civil War. India will then be used to rally the strident jehadis to stop their assault and come under the fold of the army. It could help the Pakistani Army to plead helplessness with the US and make US force India to talk and back down. The Army will use the civilian front, especially Gilani, to make demands on India as a price for continued support to the US.
How can India react? There are two schools of thougts. One is not to get provoked and give the room to the PA by agreeing to talk to the civilian leadership, whilst keeping the pressure on them to refrain from terror attacks through the jehadi group. It would also entail the Government of India to call for significant US support to add to the pressure on Pakistan.
The second is to recognise the opportunity that is being presented and go after securing Indian interests by way of holding back on talks or normalization, increasing diplomatic pressure, preparing for averting terror attacks that will be attempted and carefully using military pressure through acquisition of game changers, series of well designed military exercises oriented towards demonstrating retribution strikes deep inside pakistan, starting covert operations to furtner accentuate the widening differences between regions internally. Let us bear in mind that all this would mean confronting and conflicting the US.
Judging by recent actions of the GoI it seems to me that option 1 is being persued. Maybe that is the right one to pursue at this stage. It would be more in line with the vision of India and the priorities of the present administration. The emphasis is to continue to grow and limit the potential of pakistan to damage or threaten the growth prospects in India. So India will do only that which it is necessary to protect India. A minimum credible defence of India. We have to recognise that this seems to be the desire of majority of Indians. It is another matter if this is right or wrong.
It might be a bit unpalatable to many here, but many Indians, I do believe, feel that a strong and stable Pakistan is possible and that such a state will willingly accept the reality of India and will live as good neighbours, if not as good friends. It may be even more unpalatable but there is a significant section of Indian elite, who believe that "inclusive growth" should extend to all our neighbours and we must help Pakistan at its hour of crisis.
Gentle Readers, think a little harder and further, and you will get to what I am indicating through these posts. I am making the following points:
1. There is a conflict of interest between what will serve India and what will serve US with regard to Pakistan. It is not in India's interest in anyway for the artificial state of Pakistan to survive. The US on the other hand wants it to survive if it can and be the cat's paw for them against Jehadis who have a thing or two against the US.
2. The state of Pakistan is at the brink, and its much vaunted survival instincts are undergoing its severest test. The institution that still has a stake in holding the artificial state of Pakistan together is the Pakistani Army. It is now caught in a three way pincer (if you can imagine one!) of American pressure, Islamic Jehadis who dream of taking over from them as the top dog and a resurgent India.
3. The benefactors of Pakistan have often conflicting and competing interests in Pakistan but all of them would like the state to survive. However, there is now a limitation on what they can do to save the state. This presents an opportunity for India.
4. The final arbiter and keeper of Pakistani destiny, the Pakistan Army is facing a major change in circumstances and its cohesiveness and hold over itself is now under threat. Its leadership no longer enjoys the unity of command, nor is there a willingness to crush internal revolts to its leadership.
So gentle reader, think a little bit more and you will get the answer. What we cannot afford at this point is a policy of drift or a policy of convergence with US interests. What is seen however is a mixture of both. That is the worrying part. The relenting of pressure and resumptions of talks serves American interests, it does not serve ours.
India is looking for a minimum credible defence against pakistan so that 8% GDP growth is achieved. While it is important to chase that growth, there should be a recognition that guaranteeing that growth can only be done by securing India and protecting soverign interests. National Security and neutralizing Pakistan seems to have been relegated to a distant second in terms of priorities. It would be a costly mistake and a remiss on the part of GOI if that is indeed the case.
Such a view, is at best a lonely lament nowadays. The vast majority of Indians and the GOI does not seem to realize the need of the hour or the opportunity that is presenting itself. As usual these are just stray thoughts steming from the rumblings in the wind. Take it for what it is worth.
Thursday, June 11, 2009
Can we afford a Policy of Drift?
First posted as a post on Bharat Rakshak forum
Can we afford a policy of drift?
Gentle readers, the new GOI has been formed and the first indications for the more discerning are that couple of fundamental points that I have articulated in this forum in the past are getting reinforced.
1. This time round, with the a stronger mandate for the Congress, it is clear that economic growth will get overriding priority. The PM Manmohan Singh's vision of India is one based on the "Japan model" -to ensure that India emerges as an economic powerhouse primarily with a stake in international coalation of democratic powers.
2. There will be a continuation of policy of minimum engagement with neighbouring states and an increasing linkages with ASEAN, Mid East and G20 groups. Security is not seen as a pre-requisite for economic growth, but just a necessity to be looked at insofar it comes in the way of economic growth. "Hire some security guards to guard the bank and be done with it", seems to be the approach.
How have the above points been reinforced? The Presidential address to the Indian Parliament, the PM's reply to that address, all indicate the primacy of economic growth. The complete silence on internal security front, the complete silence on re-engagement in Sri Lanka to secure Tamil interests and by extension Indian interests there, the clear announcement in the parliament that China is not an adversary despite clear acts by China against core Indian interests, the indication of resumption of talks with Pakistan despite nothing being done by Pakistan post Mumbai killings are all evidence to the above assertions.
With this in mind, let us examine, gentle readers, the first signs of post election approach to the events in Pakistan. The GOI has not indicated in any way that there will be no let up on the pressure on the pakistani government. On the contrary, there seems to be a nudge from the Obama administration to resume talks at least in private and India seems to be reluctant to assert itself. Why is this? Has the US promised anything to India that will ensure that Pakistan will desist from lauching further terror attacks? The last few months, there has been no terror attacks of significance. The apparatus is there. But it is silent. In return, has India been promised that Pakistan will be broken up as per US plans and GOI aid that process by not providing an obvious rallying point to fend off the impending implosion of the Pakistani state?
For there seems to be a policy of general drift. One of trying to cope with the situation around us and minimise impact as long as the cherished goal of becoming a "Japan like" state is achieved. Rather than shaping the events around us to ensure that Indian interests, and independence are maintained, the PM seems to think that there is a possibility of reaching a peaceful settlement with Pakistan. The PM seems to think that Pakistani establishment will accept the reality of India as an economic power and a united country. The PM seems to think that the guarantors of Pakistan - the US, Saudi and PRC all have accepted India as a major power and they would allow, counsel and encourage Pakistan to deliver peace.
As a lay observer, I see no evidence of any of that happening. The Pakistani establishment sees no incentive in peace with India. What do they get? What will the major powers get? As of now, nothing. I am sure, that with the all the wherewithal of the state at his disposal, the PM should know better.
Every thinking Indian will not find comfort if the GOI returns to talks with Pakistan. It would be a victory of Pakistani policy if that happens. A great blunder if we resume talks without any tangible results are achieved as retribution. Nothing has happened. The Pakistani elite, whilst begging, have now begun to talk about the need for India to resume talks and have started demanding Kashmir. They have been emboldened and encouraged to do this by the West.
The US and Indian interests are not converging on what needs to be done in Pakistan. The US wants India to pay the price for its citizens to remain protected from jehadis of pakistan. The GOI does not seem to be in any hurry now to ensure that Pakistan is made accountable. There is no threat of general elections now for the GOI and even if it was there, security is not an issue for our countrymen. Bitter as it may sound, our people have not responded to the threat that we face from terror and Pakistan and have not demanded that the government act and stop this.
There is no mention of improving security, no gameplan against Maoists, no gameplan for Nepal or Myanmar. Nothing to show for any clarity of thought. We are drifting along and have an inexperienced foreign minister who is more adept in handling economic issues than foreign policy issues. There is no sense of urgency. No revamp of laws, police or judicial services. No accountability at all. If the government invests even 20% of the time and resources that it spends on NREGA programmes, inclusive growth, subsidies and freebies, our security situation would have improved. There is no vision beyond GDP growth.
India runs the risk of ignoring its neighbours at its own peril. Pakistan will pose an existential threat and a humanatarian crisis for us in the next 5 years. Millions are going to pour across the border if Pakistan implodes in to bloody civil war. The US will be forced to join in and they may want India sucked into it. The same is the case with Nepal which is now more and more getting into the ambit of China. There is no improvement in the actions of Bangladesh despite Hasina getting back into power. There is no rehabilitation initiative, post the LTTE rout in Sri Lanka, like what was done in Afghanistan. Nothing has been done to thwart the moves of China.
The need of the hour is to force Pakistan to dismantle its terror machine and hand over its leadership for trial. GOI should not shirk its duty towards its people on this and let the interests of the US dictate how India responds. There should no be relief extended to Pakistan. Military pressure must be built up and so should diplomatic pressure on closing down terror. It should not be linked to resumption of talks. It should be demanded as the minimum that would be required for India to even consider talking to pakistan - be it track 1 or track N level.
Be that as it may, we should also recognise, gentle readers, that the majority of Indians do not think like this. They think like what GOI is currently thinking, we should worry about stock markets, travel advisories, economic growth, minority rights, and do a deal with Pakistan so that we can get on with the agenda of money making. If we become an economic powerhouse, everything will be allright.
We have a government today that actually reflects the will of the people. We deserve what we are going to get, the good, bad and the ugly. For all practical purposes, it looks like that the GOI will start talking to pakistan. The terror attacks will continue, only larger in scale this time. We will pay for it in blood, but the GDP will be 8%. After all that is the only thing that is important isn't it?
Just a ramble for what it is worth. If you get the drift...
Can we afford a policy of drift?
Gentle readers, the new GOI has been formed and the first indications for the more discerning are that couple of fundamental points that I have articulated in this forum in the past are getting reinforced.
1. This time round, with the a stronger mandate for the Congress, it is clear that economic growth will get overriding priority. The PM Manmohan Singh's vision of India is one based on the "Japan model" -to ensure that India emerges as an economic powerhouse primarily with a stake in international coalation of democratic powers.
2. There will be a continuation of policy of minimum engagement with neighbouring states and an increasing linkages with ASEAN, Mid East and G20 groups. Security is not seen as a pre-requisite for economic growth, but just a necessity to be looked at insofar it comes in the way of economic growth. "Hire some security guards to guard the bank and be done with it", seems to be the approach.
How have the above points been reinforced? The Presidential address to the Indian Parliament, the PM's reply to that address, all indicate the primacy of economic growth. The complete silence on internal security front, the complete silence on re-engagement in Sri Lanka to secure Tamil interests and by extension Indian interests there, the clear announcement in the parliament that China is not an adversary despite clear acts by China against core Indian interests, the indication of resumption of talks with Pakistan despite nothing being done by Pakistan post Mumbai killings are all evidence to the above assertions.
With this in mind, let us examine, gentle readers, the first signs of post election approach to the events in Pakistan. The GOI has not indicated in any way that there will be no let up on the pressure on the pakistani government. On the contrary, there seems to be a nudge from the Obama administration to resume talks at least in private and India seems to be reluctant to assert itself. Why is this? Has the US promised anything to India that will ensure that Pakistan will desist from lauching further terror attacks? The last few months, there has been no terror attacks of significance. The apparatus is there. But it is silent. In return, has India been promised that Pakistan will be broken up as per US plans and GOI aid that process by not providing an obvious rallying point to fend off the impending implosion of the Pakistani state?
For there seems to be a policy of general drift. One of trying to cope with the situation around us and minimise impact as long as the cherished goal of becoming a "Japan like" state is achieved. Rather than shaping the events around us to ensure that Indian interests, and independence are maintained, the PM seems to think that there is a possibility of reaching a peaceful settlement with Pakistan. The PM seems to think that Pakistani establishment will accept the reality of India as an economic power and a united country. The PM seems to think that the guarantors of Pakistan - the US, Saudi and PRC all have accepted India as a major power and they would allow, counsel and encourage Pakistan to deliver peace.
As a lay observer, I see no evidence of any of that happening. The Pakistani establishment sees no incentive in peace with India. What do they get? What will the major powers get? As of now, nothing. I am sure, that with the all the wherewithal of the state at his disposal, the PM should know better.
Every thinking Indian will not find comfort if the GOI returns to talks with Pakistan. It would be a victory of Pakistani policy if that happens. A great blunder if we resume talks without any tangible results are achieved as retribution. Nothing has happened. The Pakistani elite, whilst begging, have now begun to talk about the need for India to resume talks and have started demanding Kashmir. They have been emboldened and encouraged to do this by the West.
The US and Indian interests are not converging on what needs to be done in Pakistan. The US wants India to pay the price for its citizens to remain protected from jehadis of pakistan. The GOI does not seem to be in any hurry now to ensure that Pakistan is made accountable. There is no threat of general elections now for the GOI and even if it was there, security is not an issue for our countrymen. Bitter as it may sound, our people have not responded to the threat that we face from terror and Pakistan and have not demanded that the government act and stop this.
There is no mention of improving security, no gameplan against Maoists, no gameplan for Nepal or Myanmar. Nothing to show for any clarity of thought. We are drifting along and have an inexperienced foreign minister who is more adept in handling economic issues than foreign policy issues. There is no sense of urgency. No revamp of laws, police or judicial services. No accountability at all. If the government invests even 20% of the time and resources that it spends on NREGA programmes, inclusive growth, subsidies and freebies, our security situation would have improved. There is no vision beyond GDP growth.
India runs the risk of ignoring its neighbours at its own peril. Pakistan will pose an existential threat and a humanatarian crisis for us in the next 5 years. Millions are going to pour across the border if Pakistan implodes in to bloody civil war. The US will be forced to join in and they may want India sucked into it. The same is the case with Nepal which is now more and more getting into the ambit of China. There is no improvement in the actions of Bangladesh despite Hasina getting back into power. There is no rehabilitation initiative, post the LTTE rout in Sri Lanka, like what was done in Afghanistan. Nothing has been done to thwart the moves of China.
The need of the hour is to force Pakistan to dismantle its terror machine and hand over its leadership for trial. GOI should not shirk its duty towards its people on this and let the interests of the US dictate how India responds. There should no be relief extended to Pakistan. Military pressure must be built up and so should diplomatic pressure on closing down terror. It should not be linked to resumption of talks. It should be demanded as the minimum that would be required for India to even consider talking to pakistan - be it track 1 or track N level.
Be that as it may, we should also recognise, gentle readers, that the majority of Indians do not think like this. They think like what GOI is currently thinking, we should worry about stock markets, travel advisories, economic growth, minority rights, and do a deal with Pakistan so that we can get on with the agenda of money making. If we become an economic powerhouse, everything will be allright.
We have a government today that actually reflects the will of the people. We deserve what we are going to get, the good, bad and the ugly. For all practical purposes, it looks like that the GOI will start talking to pakistan. The terror attacks will continue, only larger in scale this time. We will pay for it in blood, but the GDP will be 8%. After all that is the only thing that is important isn't it?
Just a ramble for what it is worth. If you get the drift...
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
Talk on National Security & National Interests
One of my first public musings! It has been a life long passion of mine to learn about all matters related to defence forces of India. It started when I was about 14 years, fascinated as I was with the various defence and weapons systems. It slowly developed over time to learn about the ethos of our armed forces, then to strategic matters. Over time, I have developed my own take on strategic affairs and National security related issues.
I have learnt a lot from my long association with Bharat Rakshak , a compendium of Indian military sites. One of the first comprehensive ones on the Internet and the most comprehensive one at that. There are very informative and active forums on the site that attracts a wide range of passionate enthusiasts with a lot of knowledge on varied range of subjects.
That apart, I have learnt a lot on my own. I do not claim to be an expert or academic from a strategic think tank, but definitely a well informed citizen on these matters. Over the years, I have felt the need to create an awareness about these important matters amongst Indians. Most of us do not seem to have an understanding of most of these issues and the media in India can at best described as incompetent and incoherent.
Recently, I made a small presentation to a forum that encourages debates on issues of national interest in Chennai. The audience comprised largely the elder generation. The objective of the forum, called Brains Trust, is to bring forth issues of national importance to a larger audience devoid of ideological colourings usually provided by a disingenious media and provide a forum for people to understand the reality that is beneath.
For me it was the first attempt to talk to a public forum on this subject. The presentation I had made on that occassion is attached. I have drawn heavily on the slides made by D.Ramana who is one of the forum moderators in Bharat Rakshak forums. An old friend and a brilliant Indian!
Over the next few posts, I will elaborate on some of these topics. I usually call these rambles, when I post these occassionally in the BR forum. So you can expect more rambles and musings here.
Please take a look and share your views.
I have learnt a lot from my long association with Bharat Rakshak , a compendium of Indian military sites. One of the first comprehensive ones on the Internet and the most comprehensive one at that. There are very informative and active forums on the site that attracts a wide range of passionate enthusiasts with a lot of knowledge on varied range of subjects.
That apart, I have learnt a lot on my own. I do not claim to be an expert or academic from a strategic think tank, but definitely a well informed citizen on these matters. Over the years, I have felt the need to create an awareness about these important matters amongst Indians. Most of us do not seem to have an understanding of most of these issues and the media in India can at best described as incompetent and incoherent.
Recently, I made a small presentation to a forum that encourages debates on issues of national interest in Chennai. The audience comprised largely the elder generation. The objective of the forum, called Brains Trust, is to bring forth issues of national importance to a larger audience devoid of ideological colourings usually provided by a disingenious media and provide a forum for people to understand the reality that is beneath.
For me it was the first attempt to talk to a public forum on this subject. The presentation I had made on that occassion is attached. I have drawn heavily on the slides made by D.Ramana who is one of the forum moderators in Bharat Rakshak forums. An old friend and a brilliant Indian!
Over the next few posts, I will elaborate on some of these topics. I usually call these rambles, when I post these occassionally in the BR forum. So you can expect more rambles and musings here.
Please take a look and share your views.
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